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Kant's Liberalism:
A Reply to Rolf George

LESLIE GREEN

York University

In his thoughtful paper. ""The Liberal Tradition, Kant, and the Pox",

Rolf George joins the venerable argument about whether Kant should be
accounted friend or foe of liberals. But this is not just a rehearsal of the
debate over the compatibility of the Old Jacobin' s defense of civil
liberties and government by consent with his notoriously unpleasant
doctrines of the absolute duty to obey the law or his ruthlessly retributive
view of punishment. George advances the debate by suggesting that
elements of Kant's moral theory are deeply incompatible with
Liberalism. And this is particularly striking when liberals like John
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick are quick to invoke Kant's
name in defense of their own views. The attraction of Kant for these
modern (and American) liberals is clear, for they hold individualistic
moral theories and they reject utilitarianism. But, if George is right,
there are aspects of Kant's thought which make him an unsuitable
mascot.
George argues that even in very minor matters, such as the question of
whether it is permissible to inoculate oneself against smallpox, Kant's
rigid formalism makes heavy demands. Merely desiring to inoculate
oneself is a violation of duty (though this depends on a dubious Malthusian argument which is as much cant as Kant). When combined with the
thesis that the smallest violation of the moral law annihilates civic
personality in the offender, this supports the conclusion that most
people fall in the class of vilia who are not full legislating members of the
realm of ends. But then the republic remains an unreachable ideal and
autocratic rule becomes a favoured second-best needed to break man's
wilfulness. Thus Kant cannot be a liberal, if that means one who favours
little state interference on the pursuit of individual good, who sees
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political morality as "little more than procedures with which to regulate
our life together", and whose vision of life is a secular one which
celebrates not only self-expression but the pursuit of self-interest, the
clash of wills, and a desire to dominate nature.
I do not wish to take issue with George's readingofKant(though I am
a little hesitant to let much tum on his remarks about the pox, and
unpersuaded that Kant's considered view was that any violation of the
moral law wholly deprives one of civic personality). My complaint is
rather with his understanding of the liberal tradition, and his failure to
distinguish Kant's moral theory from his political one.
Any argument about what liberalism is is itself a political argument.
George's view is one heavily influenced by modem laissez-faire writers:
it is the liberalism of Smith, Hayek and Nozick. As such, it is more
distant from the views of, e.g., Montesquieu and Tocqueville, or even
important strands in Locke and Mill. This is not, I take it, an irrelevant
point of nomenclature, for George's thesis is not that Kant held some
unattractive views, but that he held views which put his liberal credentials in doubt. What is required to substantiate that thesis? As a matter of
present ideology, Kant is recognized as a friend by many liberals. But
that is not in dispute. And remember that some philosophers are part of
the liberal tradition even though they cannot themselves be accounted
liberal (e.g., Hobbes). However, even if we insist that all members of the
liberal tradition must satisfy tests more stringent than those of being
accepted by other liberals or providing arguments on which the tradition
draws, l think we can defend Kant while at the same time explaining the
unpleasant features of hjs thought.
There are many themes in eighteenth-century political thought which
cannot be arranged along a unidimensional liberal-nonliberal spectrum.
Consider, for instance, the emergence of democratic ideas. It was a very
long time indeed before liberals made friends with democracy; the
question of the relation between the two was not even well-posed before
Tocqueville. Strands of monarchical or even '"autocratic" thought are
thus often present even alongside a professed commitment to political
liberty. Or again, we find echoes of civic republicanism in various
writers, a hankering after the moral order of Rome or Sparta (at least as
idealized and idolized by writers like Rousseau). Republicanism is
characterized by talk of virtue and the thought that government should
contribute to the moral improvement of citizens. Now, if we collapse
these three dimensions-the liberal, the democratic, and the
republican-into one, it may seem that Kant does not score terribly high
on it. His defense of freedom of the press looks good, but his insistence
on subservience to law looks bad. The antipatemalist remarks sit well,
but not the notion that the law must break man's will. And so forth. But
there is no reason to collapse these dimensions into one, for they respond to different, perhaps incommensurable, political values: freedom,
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virtue, and self-rule. What looks like a weak commitment to freedom
may then be understood as the demands of virtue; scepticism about the
possibilities of self-rule may be realism about the preconditions of freedom. To think that a liberal-let alone an eighteenth century one-must
inhabit a conceptual world organized by doctrines made popular by
some nineteenth-century writers and their modern heirs is both an
anachronism and a moral mistake. If Kant is not liberal in this sense,
then I should regard that, not as a bad thing, but as a good thing. And if
we are to pare away at the liberal tradition until we have excised all who
show traces of metaphysical doctrines of freedom, or republican ideals,
if we are to leave out all the non-democrats, then we shall certainly lose
Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Rousseau, and possibly Locke and Mill as
well. Without a powerful political argument for performing such radical
surgery on the tradition, we are entitled to insist on an inclusive rather
than restrictive notion of liberalism, one which can encompass not only
Smith and Spencer, but also Durkheim and T. H. Green. And that will
leave plenty of room for Kant.
But there is an outstanding philosophical issue. ls Kant's formalism,
his insistence on duty for duty' s sake, an inherently ilJiberal doctrine? It
is an unsympathetic and ungenerous one ; but we should not confuse
liberalism and liberality. Liberalism is a political doctrine about the
nature and vaJue of freedom, one especiaJly concerned with the limits of
legitimate state action. But notice that Kant' s remarks about the pox do
not recommend that the government should prohibit inoculation on the
ground that it should save people from moral error. Kant's morality was
indeed subservient to the stem commands of duty; but his political
theory elaborated a framework of rights within which the moral life
should be lived.
Can a morality of duty be combined in this way with a politics of
rights? George says that duty regulates only action, not interaction, and
follows Constant's objection to Kant's thesis that one should betray the
innocent rather than violate the absolute prohibition on lying. One
cannot, the objection goes, have a duty without there being some corresponding right, and the wrong-doer has no right to be told where the
innocent person is hiding. Thus, ''the Kantian moral philosophy ...
singularly fails to bring into focus the reciprocity of rights and duties, and
interaction in general". But this argument fails because its crucial premise is false. It is not true that one has a duty to do X only if there is
someone who has a right that X be done. Suppose someone thought that
we have a duty not to destroy the great redwood trees. He would not
thereby be committed to the view that the trees (or anyone else) have a
right that we not destroy them. Note that I am not arguing that the case
for believing in such a duty would not be stronger if there was someone,
e.g., future generations, who had the right. I only contend that it is
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neither a conceptual nor moral mistake to think that some duties are not
grounded in the rights of others. Indeed, on Kant's moral theory there is
a reciprocity of rights and duties, but it goes the other way around. The
right of the innocent person not to be ltarmed is on the Kantian view a
consequence of the fact that the offender has a duty not to harm him. In
situations like the one described there may be a conflict of duty (benevolence vs. honesty) but that is not unique to Kantianism.
Can liberalism speak the language of duty? Should it not instead speak
the language of rights? Understood as a doctrine of political restraint
whose primary aim is to limit what governments may do to their citizens,
liberalism may seem to make rights primary at the political level. The
duties of rulers are indeed often grounded in the rights of citizens. (It
would be very odd to think, for example, that the foundation of our right
to freedom of expression is the fact that our rulers have an independently
justified duty not to interfere. The ground of their duty is our right.) But
that is quite compatible with the rest of moral theory being duty-based,
or being based on considerations other than those of rights or duties. We
must not forget that Rousseau , Mill and T. H. Green are also part of the
liberal tradition and that for many other liberals notions of virtue and the
common good were more important than individual rights. The stern
voice of duty does indeed make Kant's moral theory unpleasant. But
Kant's conception of the polity as a union of free, equal and independent
beings, bound onJy to those principles which could command their
unanimous assent, is at least partly independent of this. He never suggests that the role of government is to force people to do their duty; that
would be incompatible with their autonomy. The categorical imperative
may be a useless device for explaining conflicts of duty, but that has
nothing to do with any supposed difference between action and transaction or the correlativity of rights and duties. I conclude that Kant was
indeed a liberal, of sorts. But he was no democrat, and he picked up,
perhaps from Rousseau, some traces of republicanism. On one important point, however, I am in complete agreement with George. Kant's
liberalism is not very secuJar. His republic remains a regulative ideal,
just as his idea of government by consent is purely fictive: one is bound
to any political arrangement to which it is not impossible that one would
have consented if asked. The thinness of these notions should perhaps
give pause to those modern liberals who appeal to his authority. We
should remind them that Kant was not the only liberal. George might
wish to call their attention to Spencer and Smith; l would prefer they
look to Rousseau and Mill.

